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Abstract:  The paper proposes the use of a range of alternative measures to provide a rounded 
evaluation of the distributional consequences of farm income mobility, where this multifaceted 
approach is designed to shed light both on the extent to which farm income inequality is a short-run 
phenomenon due to transitory shocks rather than a chronic or persistent problem due to structural 
factors, and on the nature of the dynamic processes driving changes in farm income inequality over 
time.  An illustrative empirical study of Scottish agriculture using Farm Accounts Survey data 
reveals that the majority of farm income inequality was structural in nature despite a substantial 
degree of income risk due to the volatility of agricultural incomes.  Results on the micro-dynamics 
of inequality change have to be interpreted with caution due to the particular rules governing the 
assignment of farm identifiers in the survey.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the enduring goals of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been “to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual 
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture” (Treaty of Rome, 1957), where not only the average 
level but also the distribution and stability of farm incomes have generally been viewed as being of 
policy concern (Hill, 2012).  Thus successive reforms since 1992 have continued to provide income 
support and safety net mechanisms for producers while increasing the market orientation of the 
agricultural sector.  The most recent reform package seeks to ensure a more equitable distribution of 
direct payments among countries and farmers, while also including a new reserve to secure the 
financial resources needed in case of crisis and a new income stabilisation tool as part of a package 
of risk management measures (see European Commission, 2013).   
Analyses of individual agricultural incomes typically focus either on the static distributional 
consequences of support (e.g. Keeney, 2000; Allanson, 2008: Morreddu. 2011) or on income 
instability issues (e.g. Hegrenes et al., 2001; Mishra and Sandretto, 2002; Finger and El Benni, 
2014).  The main aim of this paper is to explore the distributional implications of farm income 
mobility in Scottish agriculture and thereby address three distinct but interrelated issues.  Firstly we 
consider the extent to which inequality is a short-run phenomenon due to transitory shocks as 
opposed to a chronic or persistent problem due to structural factors.  Income inequality may be less 
of a policy concern if it is largely a transitory phenomenon such that farm incomes are equalised 
over the longer term.  Second we seek to investigate the impact of systematic changes in the size 
structure of the farm sector on the observed level of inequality over time.  In particular we consider 
whether structural changes have been distributionally neutral in relative terms, which will be the 
case if expected income growth rates are independent of size and therefore consistent with Gibrat’s 
Law (Gibrat, 1931).  Finally we provide estimates of a measure of income risk based on a dynamic 
 2 
 
model of farm incomes that explicitly takes into account the impact of both transitory shocks and 
structural change.   
The paper adds to a relatively small body of literature that makes use of longitudinal data to 
analyse the micro-dynamics of farm incomes.  In particular, a number of previous studies (e.g. 
Hegrenes et al., 2001, Meuwissen et. al., 2008) have provided evidence of considerable volatility in 
individual farm incomes, thereby emphasising the importance of using multiyear average data to 
draw meaningful conclusions about the living standards of individual farmers.  We extend this work 
by providing complementary measures of income risk that measure transitory shocks about 
expected equilibrium incomes rather than about multiyear average incomes.  Phimister et al. (2004) 
further explore the impact of the movements of farms within the income distribution on the 
persistence of poverty in Scottish agriculture, building on an older tradition of modelling mobility 
within agriculture using transition matrices (see e.g. Meuwissen et. al (2008) for a recent example).  
We more broadly consider the impact of structural mobility across the whole of the income 
distribution using a range of methods that have been developed in the broader economics literature 
but not previously applied to agriculture. 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides an overview of the methods 
that are employed to explore the distributional implications of farm income mobility.  Section 3 
presents the empirical study of income mobility in Scottish agriculture, which is based on an 
unbalanced panel of farms drawn from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey over the production 
years 1995-2009.  The final section concludes with a discussion of the empirical findings in the 
light of the most recent round of CAP reform.   
2.  Methodology  
The multifaceted nature of income mobility has resulted in the emergence of several distinct strands 
in the literature characterising the distributional implications of the phenomenon.  Jantti and Jenkins 
(2015) in their recent handbook article identify four main aspects of income mobility that may be of 
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normative significance: reduction of longer-term inequality, individual income growth, positional 
change and income risk.  In this section, we outline a range of methods that allow us to capture all 
four of these distinct dimensions and thereby provide a rounded evaluation of the distributional 
consequences of farm income mobility. 
2.1. Choice of inequality measure 
The inequality measure used throughout the subsequent analysis is the Gini coefficient.  Let ( )tG y  
be the Gini coefficient of incomes in year t, which can be written as: 
 
2
( ) cov ,t it it
t
G y y R
y
  (1) 
where ity  is the income of individual i (i=1,….N) in year t, ty  is average income, and itR  is the 
individual’s relative rank in the year t income distribution.  ( )tG y  is invariant to equiproportionate 
changes in all incomes, taking a value of zero when all individual incomes are identical and of one 
when all income accrues to one individual and everybody else receives nothing.  The choice of a 
relative inequality measure provides a natural benchmark to evaluate farm income mobility: if the 
expected income growth process satisfies Gibrat’s Law of proportionate effect then it will be 
distributionally neutral in relative terms.1   
2.2 Reduction of longer-term inequality 
Income mobility may be seen to be socially desirable to the extent that it reduces inequality over the 
longer term.  This aspect of mobility is captured by the mobility index due to Shorrocks (1978a), 
which measures the extent to which equalization occurs when the measurement period is extended 
from one to T years: 
                                                        
1  In this context, farm income is treated as a size measure.  As Kostov et al. (2005) point out, a 
wide range of different variables has been used as size measure in papers studying Gibrat’s law, 
including farmed acreage, livestock numbers, net worth, gross sales, total gross margins and net 
income (Allanson, 1992; Clarke et al. 1992; and, Shapiro et al. 1987). 
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( )
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t tt
G y
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w G y

 

 (2) 
where  ( ) 2cov ,A iA iA AG y y R y  is the Gini coefficient of individual average incomes 
1
T
iA itt
y y T

  calculated over the T-year period t=1,…,T; iAR  are the corresponding relative ranks; 
1
N
A iAi
y y N

  is overall average income over the entire period; and t t Aw y y  are a set of 
weights that sum to one by construction.  0TM   by definition if T=1.  For T>1, the index will 
equal one when longer-term incomes are exactly equalised over the measurement period such that 
the T-year Gini coefficient is equal to zero, and will equal zero when the relative incomes of all 
individual farms remains constant through time in which case the Gini coefficient for each year and 
for the measurement period as a whole will be the same.  Hence if inequality is largely a short-run 
phenomenon due to transitory income shocks then the index will take a value close to one whereas 
if inequality largely arises from long-term differences between farms then the index will take a 
value close to zero. 
2.3 Individual income growth and positional change  
The change in inequality between any two years may be decomposed into elements due to 
individual income growth and positional change,2 thereby serving to characterise the nature of the 
transition process from the initial to the final distribution of incomes.  Following Jenkins and van 
Kerm (2006; see also Kakwani, 1984), the change in the Gini coefficient from some base year s to a 
final year f may be written as:  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )f s f f s f s s H VG y G y G y CI y R CI y R G y M M        (3) 
                                                        
2  These two elements are called ‘structural’ and ‘exchange’ mobility respectively in the sociology 
literature: the former may be identified with changes in the location and shape of the marginal 
income distribution and the latter with the permutation of a fixed set of income opportunities among 
individuals. 
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where  ( , ) 2cov ,f s if is fCI y R y R y  is defined as the concentration index (CI) of final year 
incomes ranked by positions in the base year income distribution; and the vertical and horizontal 
mobility indices, VM  and HM  respectively, are discussed further below.  
    2 cov , cov ,V if is f is is sM y R y y R y   provides a measure of vertical mobility that 
addresses the question of whether the distribution of income changes favour those with initially low 
or high incomes and thereby provides a natural counterpart to ( )tG y  which addresses the 
distribution of income between the poor or rich.  VM  will be zero if income changes are unrelated 
to base year income rank and will be negative if income changes are equalising in relative terms, 
which will be the case if the initially poor experience either larger relative gains on average than the 
rich or smaller relative losses.  VM  in turn depends on the progressivity and scale of income 
changes, such that VM Pq .  Progressivity is captured by the disproportionality index 
 , ( )f s s sP CI y y R G y    where      , 2cov , /f s s if is is f sCI y y R y y R y y     is the CI of 
income changes  if isy y  ranked by base year incomes.  For any given P, the gross redistributive 
effect VM  is proportional to the relative magnitude of income changes as measured by the scale 
factor  f s fq y y y  .  Note that negative values of P imply that income changes will be 
equalising if incomes are growing on average but disequalising if incomes are falling.   
    2 cov , cov ,H if if f if is fM y R y R    is the reranking index proposed by Atkinson 
(1980) and Plotnick (1981), which captures the effect of the reshuffling of individuals within the 
income distribution.  HM  is non-negative by definition (see Lambert, 2001), implying that any 
reranking that does occur has a negative impact on the overall redistributive effect of the income 
changes.  Thus income growth will only reduce inequality if it is both pro-poor in nature and the 
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resultant vertical mobility effect is not swamped by any offsetting horizontal mobility effect due to 
the reranking of individuals. 
2.4 Income risk and the determinants of structural inequality and vertical mobility 
Interest in mobility is not only concerned with movement but also predictability, such that greater 
mobility may no longer be regarded as socially desirable if it is associated with more pronounced 
fluctuations and more uncertainty (Shorrocks, 1978a, 1978b): individuals with a preference for 
income stability and an aversion to risk may choose an income stream with a lower present value if 
it is both less volatile and more certain.  From this perspective, Jantti and Jenkins (2015) note that 
the Shorrocks mobility measure TM  may be re-interpreted as a measure of income risk if incomes 
are given as the simple sum of a fixed individual-level permanent component, approximated by T-
year average income, and an idiosyncratic transitory component that is ex-ante unknown.  In 
practice, at least some part of the change in individual incomes over time is likely to be predictable 
in which case the identification of income risk requires the specification of a model of the income 
generation process, with this approach also providing the basis for analyses of the determinants of 
structural inequality and vertical mobility. 
 For this purpose we assume the existence over time of a stable dynamic income function and 
specify a first-order autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model  with fixed effects, which allows 
for both current and lagged effects of income determinants jx  (j=1,…J), income persistence and 
individual heterogeneity:  
, 1 0 , 1 , 1
1 1
(1 )
J J
i t j ji t j jit it i t
j j
y x x y      
 
       ;     i=1,  … N;  t=1,  … T-1 (4) 
where , 1 , 1i t i i t     is an error term, composed of a fixed individual effect i  and a period 
specific disturbance , 1i t  .  Eq.(4) may also usefully be expressed in the form of an Error Correction 
Model (ECM) of the annual change in income: 
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   *, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1
;
J
i t i t it j ji t it it i t
j
y y y x y y     

         (5) 
where * 0
1
J
it j jit i
j
y x  

    (6) 
may be interpreted as a long-run steady-state or equilibrium income function with parameters 
0 0    and  j j j     , such that  *it ity y  corresponds to the ‘equilibrium error’ in the 
current period and  0 1    determines the rate of adjustment to equilibrium.  Hence, the 
change in income depends on the effects of contemporaneous changes in the determinants, the initial 
extent of any disequilibrium in income and the size of the idiosyncratic income shock.  For our 
analytical purposes, the main attraction of this representation is the clear distinction between the 
short-run dynamics and the implied long-run income relationship.  In particular, it is possible using 
the ECM to identify both the short-term impact on income inequality due to contemporaneous 
changes in income determinants and also how these factors contribute to chronic or persistent 
inequality.  Eq.(4) collapses to the static model *, 1 , 1 , 1i t i t i ty y      if there are no lagged effects of 
income determinants and full adjustment/no persistence in incomes (i.e. if the j ’s (j=1,…J) all 
equal zero and 1  ).   
2.4.1 Income risk and the analysis of structural income inequality 
We consider a measure of income risk that reflects transitory shocks about long-run or equilibrium 
incomes due to both equilibrium errors and contemporaneous income shocks, implicitly identifying 
*
ity  as the target level of income in year t.
3  Let 
^ ^ ^^*
0 1
J
it j jit ij
y x  

    where
^
0 , 
^
j  and 
^
i  are 
estimates of the corresponding parameters in the equilibrium income function (6).  An index of 
income risk in year t may then be defined as follows: 
                                                        
3  In the empirical study it is found that the contribution of structural change to vertical mobility is 
negligible, which may be taken to indicate that the equilibrium error largely arises due to the 
persistence of past income shocks. 
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 
 
^ *
1 tR
t
G y
M
G y
   (7) 
where the Gini coefficient of predicted equilibrium incomes    
^^ ^ * ** * ^2cov , /t it it tG y y R y  is interpreted 
as a measure of chronic or structural inequality; *^ty  is average predicted equilibrium income; and 
^ *
itR  is the individual’s relative rank in the predicted equilibrium income distribution.  The index will 
equal one when there is no long-term or structural inequality in which case  
^ * 0tG y  , and will 
equal zero if actual and target incomes are identical in which case    
^ *
t tG y G y .  Hence, as with 
the Shorrocks index TM , the index will take a value close to one if inequality is largely a short-run 
phenomenon due to transitory factors whereas if inequality largely arises from long-term 
differences between farms then the index will take a value close to zero.  But note that the 
normative interpretations of the two indices differ, with higher values of RM  unambiguously less 
desirable if individuals are averse to instability and risk. 
 Further information on the determinants of structural inequality may be obtained using 
regression-based procedures (see, e.g., Morduch and Sicular, 2002) to decompose the Gini 
coefficient of predicted equilibrium incomes:   
     
^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^* * * *^** *
1 1
* *
^ ^
^ ^
2 cov , 2cov , ( , ) ( , )/ /J J j jtt j jit it t i it t jt t tj j
t t
x
G y x R y R y CI x R CI R
y y
 
  
 
    
 
(8)
 
where ^ *( , )jt tCI x R  is the CI of income determinant jx  ranked by predicted equilibrium income in 
year t, with corresponding average value jtx ; and 
^ *^( , )tCI R  and ^  are the corresponding statistics 
for the individual-specific fixed-effect term.  Hence the Gini coefficient is given as a weighted sum 
of the CIs of the determinants (including the fixed effect) of predicted equilibrium income, with the 
weight on each CI equal to the share of predicted equilibrium income attributable to that factor 
where this is given by the elasticity of equilibrium income with respect to that factor evaluated at the 
means. 
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2.4.2  Determinants of vertical mobility 
Following Allanson and Petrie (2013), Eq.(5) may also be used to explore the determinants of 
vertical mobility between consecutive periods.  Specifically, if f=s+1 then VM  in (3) may be 
decomposed using (5) to yield: 
 
 
 
_______
*
*
1
^ ^^
^( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
J
j jf s s
V jf s s s s s s
j f f
f f
f s s
f f
y yx
M Pq CI x R G y CI y y R G y
y y
ye
CI e R G y
y y


           
     
    
   

 (9) 
where jfx  is the average change in income determinant j, with ( , )jf sCI x R  being the 
corresponding CI ranked by base year income; ^ j 's, and ^  are estimates of the corresponding 
parameters of the dynamic income function (5);  
_______
*^
s sy y is the mean predicted equilibrium error in 
the base year, with    
_______
* * *^ ^ ^( , ) 2cov ,s s s is is is s sCI y y R y y R y y     the corresponding CI ranked 
by base year income; and ^ ffe   are the regression residuals with mean fe and CI ranked by base 
year income ( , )f sCI e R .  It follows immediately that: 
 
 
 
 
1
_______
*
*
1
^
( , ) ( )
^ ^
^( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
EqE EqE
J
j jf
V jf s s
j f
fss s
s s s s f s s
f f
J
j j e e
j
x
M Pq CI x R G y
y
ey y
CI y y R G y CI e R G y
y y
P q P q P q



 


   

    
  


 (10) 
where VM  is given as the sum of contributions due to changes in the J income determinants, the 
predicted equilibrium error and contemporaneous income shocks in (5).  Each term in (10) is 
expressed in terms of the scale and progressivity of the income changes due to that element, with 
this further decomposition revealing how the average level of income changes and their distribution 
across base year income ranks respectively impact on vertical mobility.  For example, a positive 
scale index jq  implies a positive average income impact due to changes in the j
th income 
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determinant and if the poor enjoy a larger share of these income gains than their base year share of 
income then the progressivity index jP  will be negative giving rise to a reduction in inequality and 
hence a negative impact on VM  ceteris paribus.   
 The interpretation of 
EqEP  and EqEq  are similar in terms of the impacts of income changes due 
to the process of adjustment towards the equilibrium levels of income implied by individuals’ 
conditions in the base period,4 where this process may generally be expected to have a negative 
impact on VM  and hence reduce inequality.  To see this point, note that the contribution of the 
equilibrium error to VM  can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
     
_______
^* * **
^ *_______
*
^^ ^ ^ ^, ( )
( ) ,
^
EqE EqE
s s s s s s s s
s s ss
f f
s s
y CI y R y G y y y y
P q G y CI y R G y
y y
y y
   
    
 

 (11) 
where  
^ *,s sCI y R  is the CI of predicted equilibrium income ranked by actual incomes in the base 
year.  Interpreting  *^sG y  as a measure of chronic or long-run inequality then one would typically 
expect  
^ *, ( ) 0s s sCI y R G y   since    
^ ^* *,s s sCI y R G y  by definition (see Lambert, 2001, p.29) and 
   *^ s sG y G y  in the light of the empirical evidence that measured inequality is lower if farm 
incomes are averaged over a number of years.  
The preceding analysis may readily be extended to consider the determinants of vertical 
mobility over a multiyear period.  Thus, if f=s+m with m>1 then income changes over this period 
can be expressed in terms of the dynamic income model as:   
                                                        
4  The contribution of the equilibrium error EqE EqEP q  in (10) could be further broken down using (6) 
to identify the ‘apparent’ contribution of each equilibrium income determinant to VM  through the 
adjustment process, but this is misleading inasmuch as the causes of the disequilibrium in the base 
year are unknown.  For example, the decomposition would identify the contribution of the jth 
determinant as ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ( , ) ( )( )( )EqE j EqE j fjs jsjs sP q CI x R yG x y  , irrespective of whether the base year 
equilibrium error had arisen due to past changes in that determinant or not.   
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 *
1
J
if is ij is is i
j
y y y y

       (12) 
where:    
( 1)1
, ,
1 1 0
1 1
m kJ m
m k l
ij j ji s m j j ji s k
j k l
x x    
 

 
  
    
                 
   ; 
  
1
1
m
m k
k
 


   ;      ,
1
1
m
m k
i i s k
k
 



   ; 
and which reduces to (5) if m=1 with s≡t. Hence (10) may be generalised to give: 
 
__
1 1 _______
__
*
*
1
^
^( , ) ( )
^ ^ ^^ ^( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
J m
j
jV s s
j k f
s s
s s s s s s
f f
J
m m m m m m
j j EqE EqE e e
j
M Pq CI R G y
y
y y
CI y y R G y CI R G y
y y
P q P q P q
 
 

  
   
 
 
            
  
  
  


 (13) 
where the ^ j 's, ^  and ^  are estimates of the corresponding entities in (12), with corresponding 
mean values ^ j 's, ^  and ^ .  Therefore vertical mobility in any given multiyear period is the net 
result of the cumulative effects of changes in income determinants over the period, the equilibrium 
error in the base year, and the sequence of idiosyncratic shocks to farm incomes.  
3.  Empirical analysis 
We explore the distributional implication of farm income mobility in Scotland over the years 1995 
to 2009 using data on an unbalanced panel of farms drawn from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey 
(FAS).  The study examines mobility over both the whole of the study period and, where of interest, 
for the two sub-periods defined by the introduction of the Single Farm Payment scheme in 2005. 
3.1 Data and variable definitions 
The FAS is an annual survey of about 500 full-time farms carried out on behalf of the Scottish 
Government and provides the main source of microeconomic data on farm businesses in Scotland.  
The survey is conducted on an accounting year basis with a typical year-end in early March so, for 
example, the 1995/96 FAS centres on the 1995 production and subsidy year.  The farms in the 
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survey are chosen randomly to be representative of their size and type, where the economic size of 
the business is measured in terms of standard gross margin prior to 2003/04 and standard labour 
requirement thereafter, and the farm type classification is based on the relative importance of the 
various crop and livestock enterprises in terms of standard gross margin.5   
The FAS potentially provides a rich source of information for the analysis of farm income 
mobility since farms, once recruited, can stay in the survey for an unlimited length of time (Scottish 
Government, 2013).  The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of 942 farms, of which 151 were 
present over the whole 15 year period and with a median duration of 7 years.  Sample weights are 
used throughout the analysis with these being based on the number of farms enumerated by size and 
type in the June Agricultural Census.  The results are therefore representative of the population of 
full-time farms in Scotland, with a sampling fraction of between 3% and 4% over most of the study 
period.6  Standard errors for all mean, inequality and mobility measures are generated using a 
bootstrap procedure that reflects the sample design, with re-sampling carried out at the individual 
farm level within each stratification class.  In particular, bootstrap standard errors for the mobility 
indices take into account that the income of individual farms will be correlated across years.  
Farm income is measured by Cash Income, which represents the cash return to the group 
with an entrepreneurial interest in the farm for their manual and managerial labour and on all their 
investment in the business (Department of the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
                                                        
5  The sampling frame excludes small farms less than 8 Economic Size Units (ESUs) prior to 
2003/04 and 0.5 Standard Labour Requirements (SLRs) thereafter; specialist livestock units larger 
than 200 ESU prior to 2003/04; and certain minor farm types (most notably horticulture and 
specialist pigs and poultry farms).   
6  Farms that were directly affected by foot and mouth disease culls and compensation are excluded 
from the analysis, but the resultant sub-samples for 2001/02 and 2002/03 are nevertheless sufficient 
“to give a representative picture of full-time Scottish farm businesses” in these years (SEERAD, 
2003, 2004a). 
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2002) and is defined as the difference between total receipts and total expenditure.  The measure is 
seen as corresponding closely to the income position as perceived by the farmer, but it is important 
to recognise that it does not include non-farm sources of income about which FAS collects only 
limited information.  The analysis is conducted at the farm level rather than per unit of unpaid 
labour because of doubts concerning the relevance and reliability of data on the unpaid labour input 
in the UK context (see Hill 1991).  
The only determinants of farm income included in the ARDL model specification, other 
than year slope dummies, are crop and livestock standard gross margins (SGMs).  SGMs are 
representative of the level of gross margin – enterprise output less variable costs – that could be 
expected on an average farm under ‘normal’ conditions and are calculated using SGM coefficients 
per unit area of crops and per head of livestock.  We ensure consistency over time by using the most 
recent set of SGM coefficients available, based on Scottish averages for the years 1998 to 2002, to 
calculate SGMs for the entire period. 
3.2 Reduction of longer-term inequality 
The first two columns of Table 1 indicate the considerable level of fluctuation in farm incomes over 
the production years 1995 to 2009, with the coefficient of variation of average annual cash incomes 
equal to 20% over the period.  Farm incomes fell after 1996 due to a combination of factors 
including a strong pound, weak world commodity prices and the impact of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy; and only recovered gradually following the end of the Foot and Mouth Disease 
outbreak in 2001.  Changes in the Gini coefficient reflect changes in both the absolute dispersion 
and mean level of cash incomes, with relative inequality generally higher in years of lower average 
incomes. 
Turning to the instability of individual farm incomes then MT approaches an asymptotic 
value of about 13% as the measurement period is extended from the base year of 1995.  Two 
tentative conclusions may be drawn from this finding.  First most income changes reflect short to 
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medium term variability due to transitory shocks, with no further equalisation once relative incomes 
have approached their long-term or ‘permanent’ values after about 10 years.  Second, the 
overwhelming bulk of cross-sectional inequality, as measured by annual Gini coefficients, may be 
thought of as being structural in nature inasmuch as it reflects persistent differences in incomes 
between farms.  Choosing 2005 as the base year leads to higher values of MT for any given T>1, but 
not too much should be read into this finding as the index is sensitive to the choice of base year for 
small T.  Phimister et al. (2004) have previously reported an 8% fall in the Gini coefficient for 
Scotland over the period 1988 to 1999 if cash income values are calculated using rolling two-year 
individual farm averages.  
3.3 Individual income growth and positional change  
The top panel of Table 2 presents the decomposition of annual changes in the Gini coefficient into 
vertical and horizontal components based on Eq. (3), where the results are generated using 
observations on all farms present in both the base and final year, and are therefore not strictly 
comparable either with the annual summary statistics presented in Table 1 or between pairs of 
years.  These results reveal three main points of interest.  First, the vertical mobility index VM  is 
significantly negative in all cases, indicating that expected annual income changes had an 
equalising effect throughout the period.  Thus farms with low incomes in one year experienced 
either larger relative income gains on average than richer farms over the following year or smaller 
relative losses, although most of the progressivity index estimates and some of the scale factors are 
not significantly different from zero.  Second, the horizontal mobility index RM  is significantly 
positive in all cases, reflecting the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on the ranking of farms in 
the income distribution between successive years.  Third, the progressive effect of expected income 
changes was only sufficient to outweigh the disequalising impact of re-ranking in some years, with 
no clear trend in the level of farm income inequality over the entire period.  
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 The finding that expected income changes are not independent of base year incomes may be 
interpreted as a rejection of Gibrat’s Law of proportionate effect.  However this conclusion needs to 
be treated with some caution as the apparent progressivity of farm income growth may simply 
reflect regression to the mean: if individual incomes are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (or 
measurement errors) that are uncorrelated over time then the expected income increase of a farm 
with below-average income will be positive while that of farm with above-average income will be 
negative.  We employ a number of alternative strategies to investigate whether the observed 
progressivity of income growth is in fact spurious. 
 First we consider multiyear rather than annual changes in income inequality on the 
assumption that extending the measurement period is likely to reduce the importance of the 
transitory component in any observed change.  The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the results of 
these multiperiod decomposition analyses, which have been generated using observations on all 
farms present throughout the relevant measurement period.  As before, we find that vertical 
mobility was significantly negative, with the incomes of poorer farms appearing to grow faster than 
richer ones even over the full study period.  Nevertheless inequality rose over the first sub-period 
and the full period but not over the second sub-period from 2004 to 2009. 
Our other two robustness checks employ income smoothing and instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques to mitigate the potential for bias due to transitory shocks in the estimation of vertical 
mobility.  First we follow common practice in the mobility literature by measuring income as a 
three-year centred moving average to reduce the impact of transitory variability (see, e.g. Solon, 
2002).  Second, we employ the IV approach proposed by Jenkins and van Kerm (2011) to purge the 
rank variable of income shocks by replacing observations on ranks in the base year distribution with 
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estimates based on ranks in the distribution of the average of one year lag and lead incomes.7  Table 
3 presents the results of these alternative estimates of VM where we examine changes both over 
successive three year periods and the full (truncated) study period.  These show that when the 
analysis is done using smoothed income data then income growth is still significantly pro-poor in 
most cases but the extent of vertical mobility is typically reduced somewhat.  Conversely only two 
of the IV estimates of VM  are significantly different from zero, one negative and one positive, 
which might suggest that neither poorer nor richer farms are favoured by structural developments in 
the industry.  In conclusion, the results provide at best only weak evidence against Gibrat’s law, 
with transitory shocks likely to account for at least some and maybe all of the observed bias of 
annual income growth rates in favour of poorer farms.  
3.4  Income risk and the determinants of structural inequality and vertical mobility 
The further analysis of mobility is based on estimates of the dynamic income model (5).  OLS 
estimates of (5) will be biased due to the correlation between lagged income and the fixed effects in 
the error term (see Bond, 2002, for a discussion).  To overcome this problem we follow Mundlak 
(1978) by explicitly modelling the fixed effects as a function of farm-specific crop and livestock 
SGM averages, and further control for initial conditions in the manner of Wooldridge (2005) by 
including the level of income in the year in which a farm first entered the sample as a separate 
explanatory variable.  This estimation strategy has the appeal that it provides explicit estimates of 
the farm-specific fixed effects, which will prove informative in the decomposition of structural 
                                                        
7  Noting that ( , ) ( )fV s syM CI R G y  , ( , )f syCI R  and ( )sG y  can each be estimated using the 
‘convenient regression approach’ of Kakwani et al. (1997) as the response coefficient from a simple 
regression of a normalised measure of income on base year rank, with the suggested IV procedure 
intended to eliminate possible correlation between the ‘explanatory’ rank variable and the ‘error 
term’ in this regression.  
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inequality, and avoids the further restriction of the sample that would result from the use of GMM 
estimators as these require higher-order lags of income to serve as instruments.8 
The first set of columns in Table 4 report estimation results for the Error Correction Model 
(5) with the dependent variable being the annual change in cash income.  The first two regression 
coefficients show the short-run impact of changes in the size of the crop and livestock enterprises, 
where these impacts are of very similar size (0.123 and 0.119) and imply that a £1 increase in the 
economic size of the farm as measured in terms of standard gross margins will result in an 
immediate increase in cash incomes of roughly 12 pence.  The remainder of the dynamic income 
function relates to the equilibrium error, where the coefficient on lagged income provides an 
estimate of the adjustment parameter ^  equal to 0.494, implying that just under half of the gap 
between any farm’s actual and target income in one year was closed by the next year.  Dividing the 
coefficients on the lagged determinants of income by ^  yields the parameters of the implied 
equilibrium income function (6), which are also reported in the Table.  Taking the reference year of 
1996 as an example, the implied long-run effects of changes in the size of cropping and livestock 
enterprises (0.224 and 0.590 respectively) were two and five times larger than the corresponding 
contemporaneous effects given prevailing agroeconomic conditions.  Long-run income effects of 
changes in enterprise sizes are predicted to have been positive in nearly all years, being on average 
1.7 and 2.6 times the corresponding impact effects for cropping and livestock respectively.  Finally, 
farm-level fixed effects are not significantly affected by farm-average enterprises sizes but there is a 
significant positive relationship with the level of income in the year in which the farm first entered 
the sample.  
                                                        
8  Alternative estimators lead to differing estimates of the adjustment parameter λ, with the 
preferred estimator yielding a value between the downwardly biased OLS estimator and the 
upwardly biased within-groups estimator, but broadly similar estimates of the other model 
parameters.  See Flannery and Hankins (2013) on the relative performance of alternative dynamic 
panel model estimators under differing assumptions about dataset characteristics.  
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3.4.1 Income risk and the analysis of structural income inequality 
Table 5 reports the long-run or equilibrium Gini coefficient estimates for each year in the study 
period where these are smaller than the corresponding annual Gini coefficients (repeated from 
Table 1) except in 1996, which is consistent with the finding that averaging income over a number 
of years typically reduces inequality.  Accordingly the income risk index MR  takes values in the unit 
interval in all but 1996, with an average value of 24% over the entire period indicating a substantial 
degree of income risk due to the volatility of agricultural incomes. This figure is somewhat higher 
than the asymptotic value of about 13% for the Shorrocks Index MT, though both measures imply 
that the overwhelming bulk of farm income inequality is structural in nature. 
 The remainder of the Table provides results from the analysis of the determinants of 
equilibrium or structural inequality.  On average, just over half (51.8%) of equilibrium inequality in 
farm incomes was due to observable differences in the size of farm businesses, as measured by 
economic size units: larger cropping and livestock enterprises tend to be located on farms 
generating higher cash incomes so the typically positive contributions of these enterprises to farm 
income is a source of inequality.  Cropping enterprises were somewhat more unequally distributed 
than livestock enterprises relative to farm income in most years and therefore contribute somewhat 
more to equilibrium inequality than might be inferred from their relative importance in Scottish 
agriculture.   
This leaves the remaining half (48.2%) of structural inequality attributable to farm-level 
fixed effects, where these effects make a highly significant contribution in all years.  This may seem 
a surprisingly high proportion until it is remembered what the fixed effects represent.  Firstly they 
allow for a multitude of factors - most notably land quality, weather and managerial ability - that 
affect farms’ financial performance but are hard to measure and therefore not explicitly controlled 
for in the model: empirical analyses of farm enterprise performance (e.g. Scottish Government, 
2012) provide ample evidence of the considerable variation in returns achieved by Scottish farmers.  
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Secondly, they also allow for differences in workforce composition and land ownership structure 
between farms, which will affect farms’ cash incomes but are not taken into account in the 
calculation of SGMs.  Thus chronic inequality is as much due to differences in the cash income 
generating performance of farms as in their economic size as conventionally measured. 
3.4.2  Determinants of vertical mobility 
Table 6 expands upon the results of the decomposition analysis in Table 2, identifying the separate 
contributions of changes in cropping and livestock enterprise sizes, the equilibrium error and the 
residual to the vertical mobility index MV.
9   
First, changes in the economic size of enterprises made contributions to annual vertical 
mobility that were both negligible and statistically insignificant in all years.  Moreover this 
continues to be the case even when considering vertical mobility over the entire study period.  
Further investigation reveals that this is because those farms that identifiably remained in the FAS 
tended to be ones that did not change in size appreciably rather than because any such size changes 
as did occur among these farms were distributionally neutral.  Thus the average growth in the 
economic size of farms between 1995 and 2010 is estimated to have been just 3.6% (from £54225 
to £56248) based on the 151 farms that identifiably remained in the FAS throughout the entire 
period whereas the corresponding estimate based on the full sample is 41.7% (from £55212 to 
£81226).  This discrepancy reflects the impossibility within FAS of tracking farms that are subject 
to significant structural change, such as amalgamation with another farm, because such farms are 
assigned a new identifier if they continue to participate in the survey (SEERAD, 2004b).  Thus, 
although the FAS is by design representative of the structure of Scottish agriculture over time, it is 
                                                        
9  The contribution of changes in the parameters of the equilibrium income function (6) due to the 
year slope dummies is subsumed within that of the equilibrium error in the multiyear change 
analyses. 
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not suited to the analysis of the pattern of individual farm size movements driving structural 
changes in farm income inequality.10   
The contribution of the equilibrium error to vertical mobility is significantly negative in 
every year, which is consistent with our expectations based on the discussion of Eq. (11).  More 
intuitively, adjustment towards equilibrium is equalizing since the income correction of a farm with 
below-equilibrium income due to a previous negative idiosyncratic shock will be positive while that 
of farm with above-equilibrium income will be negative.  This results in income growth appearing 
to be pro-poor despite the lack of evidence of structural change provided by the FAS panel, with the 
equilibrium error accounting on average for all of the apparent progressivity of annual income 
changes over the period.  
Finally, the contribution of the residual offsets the equalising effect of the equilibrium error 
in some years and reinforces it in others, though the effect is only significant in a few years and is 
roughly equal to zero on average over the full set of annual changes. This lack of systematic 
contribution to vertical mobility is to be expected given that the residual allows for the impact of 
idiosyncratic shocks to farm incomes after controlling for both farm-specific fixed effects and year-
specific crop and livestock enterprise slope dummies.  By construction the residual is uncorrelated 
with lagged income over the full panel.  
4.  Conclusions 
Income mobility is an inherently multidimensional concept with this paper seeking to provide a 
rounded evaluation of the distributional consequences of farm income mobility by considering a 
range of alternative measures.  In particular, this multifaceted approach reveals both the temporal 
character of farm income inequality − whether it is a short-run phenomenon due to transitory 
                                                        
10  The principal objective of FAS is to monitor changes in farm performance from year to year 
based on an “identical sample” of farms (see, e.g., SEERAD, 2004a, 2004b). 
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shocks, as opposed to a chronic or persistent problem due to structural factors − and the nature of 
the dynamic processes driving changes in farm income inequality over time.  It also highlights the 
trade-off between the perceived value on the one hand of the reduction of longer-term inequality 
due to the averaging out of transitory shocks over time and the increase in instability and risk on the 
other due to the unpredictability of incomes, where both phenomena may be seen to arise from the 
stochastic nature of the income growth process (see Allanson, 2012, for further discussion). 
The empirical analysis of farm income mobility in Scottish agriculture is based on data from 
the Farm Accounts Survey (FAS), which is well suited in principle to the task since farms, once 
recruited, can remain in the survey for an unlimited length of time.  However the sample is subject 
to a ‘virtual’ form of selective attrition whereby farms in the survey that experience significant 
structural change are assigned a new identifier and thereby become untraceable through time.11  As 
a result, balanced panels of farms constructed from the FAS will exhibit lower levels of structural 
change than the sector as a whole, casting doubt on the use of the survey to investigate the nature of 
the dynamic processes driving changes in cross-sectional inequality in terms of vertical and 
horizontal mobility components.  Moreover estimates of the Shorrocks mobility index, which 
require the calculation of multiyear average incomes, will largely capture the impact of transitory 
income shocks per se due to the limited confounding by structural changes.  Finally measures based 
on the estimation of the Error Correction Model using the full unbalanced panel of survey farms, 
namely the income risk index and the determinants of structural inequality, should be unbiased 
though less precise than would have otherwise been the case. 
The empirical results reveal that farm income inequality is partly a temporary or short-run 
phenomenon, with the estimates of the Shorrocks mobility and income risk indices implying that 
                                                        
11
  In contrast, farms in the Farm Business Survey in England and Wales retain their unique number 
except in exceptional circumstances, such as the farm splitting into two units that both continue to 
participate in the survey, but even in this case the larger unit will retain the original number (cf. 
DEFRA, 2014). 
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somewhere between one eighth and one quarter of inequality in annual incomes may be due to 
transitory shocks.  Farm income instability would likely have been higher but for the substantial 
role played by Pillar 1 direct payments in reducing the exposure of farms to market and production 
risk (Tangermann, 2011; Hennessy, 2014).  The most recent CAP reform includes a new income 
stabilisation tool as part of a ‘risk management toolkit’ under Pillar 2, which would allow for the 
compensation of farmers who experience a severe drop in their incomes (European Commission, 
2013).  However the Scottish Government (2015, p.744) has chosen not to implement this provision 
on the grounds that it is more appropriate for basic levels of income protection to be provided 
through Pillar 1 measures.   
Nevertheless the overwhelming bulk of farm income inequality is shown to have been 
structural in nature.  The subsequent decomposition analysis reveals that just over half of this long-
run inequality was, on average, due to differences in the economic size of farm businesses, with the 
remainder due to farm-level fixed effects that represent differences in both financial performance 
and business structure.  The move in Scotland from historic to area-based direct payments in the 
new CAP will inevitably redistribute support in future from farms with more intensive enterprises 
towards those with more extensive systems (see, e.g., Vosough Ahmadi et al., 2014), with the 
Scottish Government seeking to limit the resultant scale of farm income redistribution by adopting a 
regionalised model in which regional payment rates reflect the productive capacity of the land 
(Scottish Government, 2014).   
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Table 1.  Basic summary statistics and Shorrocks mobility index MT 
 Annual summary 
statistics 
 Multiyear analysis 
  Base year =1995  Base year =2005 
Year ty   ( )tG y    T ( )AG y        MT   T ( )AG y   MT  
1995 40489 *** 0.505 ***  1 0.505 *** 0.000 ***   -    
 1693 0.017    0.017 0.000       
1996 43707 *** 0.447 ***  2 0.442 *** 0.057 ***   -    
 1415 0.015    0.015 0.018       
1997 27644 *** 0.512 ***  3 0.442 *** 0.067 ***   -    
 1008 0.020    0.014 0.010       
1998 29318 *** 0.511 ***  4 0.448 *** 0.067 ***   -    
 1170 0.023    0.016 0.009       
1999 27069 *** 0.543 ***  5 0.455 *** 0.067 ***   -    
 1361 0.021    0.017 0.010       
2000 28641 *** 0.550 ***  6 0.458 *** 0.083 ***   -    
 1610 0.023    0.017 0.012       
2001 29523 *** 0.554 ***  7 0.459 *** 0.088 ***   -    
 1424 0.024    0.018 0.012       
2002 27610 *** 0.518 ***  8 0.470 *** 0.087 ***   -    
 1138 0.022    0.020 0.013       
2003 36570 *** 0.452 ***  9 0.452 *** 0.103 ***   -    
 1489 0.018    0.032 0.023       
2004 36327 *** 0.490 ***  10 0.448 *** 0.106 ***   -    
 1274  0.020    0.032  0.022        
2005 31263 *** 0.494 ***  11 0.417 *** 0.129 ***  1 0.494 *** 0.000 *** 
 1172 0.020    0.023 0.022   0.020  0.000  
2006 34245 *** 0.525 ***  12 0.395 *** 0.130 ***  2 0.475 *** 0.070 *** 
 1417 0.020    0.025 0.023   0.018  0.012  
2007 44568 *** 0.536 ***  13 0.385 *** 0.139 ***  3 0.467 *** 0.091 *** 
 1757 0.021    0.027 0.027   0.019  0.014  
2008 46834 *** 0.513 ***  14 0.390 *** 0.136 ***  4 0.449 *** 0.117 *** 
 1726 0.016    0.028 0.027   0.021  0.018  
2009 48935 *** 0.480 ***  15 0.390 *** 0.134 ***  5 0.434 *** 0.136 *** 
 1820  0.017    0.030  0.028    0.022  0.017  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eqs.(1) and (2).  Annual summary statistics based on the 
full sample available in the relevant year.  Multiyear analysis statistics are based on the sample of 
farms present in all T years of the relevant measurement period.  Bootstrapped standard errors in 
italics based on 1000 replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted 
by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Table 2.  Decomposition of changes in the annual Gini coefficient over selected periods 
Period ( )sG y   ( )fG y   Change  MV  P  q  MR  
1995-1996 0.485 *** 0.452 *** −0.033 ** −0.123 *** −1.58   0.078 *** 0.090 *** 
 0.015  0.016   0.016  0.018  4.57   0.029   0.022   
1996-1997 0.431 *** 0.492 *** 0.061 *** −0.031 ** 0.05 ** −0.571 *** 0.092 *** 
 0.012  0.016   0.016  0.015  0.03   0.042   0.009   
1997-1998 0.515 *** 0.523 *** 0.008   −0.105 *** −2.09   0.050   0.113 *** 
 0.020  0.026   0.026  0.030  500.30   0.040   0.017   
1998-1999 0.510 *** 0.544 *** 0.034   −0.073 ** 0.94   −0.078 * 0.107 *** 
 0.025  0.019   0.025  0.029  9.52   0.040   0.013   
1999-2000 0.561 *** 0.514 *** −0.047 ** −0.173 *** −2.24   0.077 * 0.126 *** 
 0.023  0.018   0.022  0.026  16.48   0.043   0.017   
2000-2001 0.523 *** 0.533 *** 0.009   −0.162 *** −1.66   0.098 ** 0.172 *** 
 0.018  0.023   0.024  0.029  31.84   0.043   0.026   
2001-2002 0.562 *** 0.510 *** −0.052 ** −0.236 *** −15.91   0.015   0.184 *** 
 0.025  0.023   0.025  0.055  102.22   0.054   0.043   
2002-2003 0.497 *** 0.512 *** 0.015   −0.074 ** −0.63 ** 0.118 *** 0.089 *** 
 0.032  0.040   0.029  0.029  0.30   0.031   0.012   
2003-2004 0.452 *** 0.464 *** 0.012   −0.120 *** 1.71   −0.070 * 0.132 *** 
 0.019  0.022   0.019  0.023  131.63   0.041   0.019   
2004-2005 0.484 *** 0.492 *** 0.008   −0.116 *** 0.79 ** −0.147 *** 0.124 *** 
 0.020  0.019   0.019  0.023  0.34   0.036   0.013   
2005-2006 0.494 *** 0.531 *** 0.037 * −0.104 *** −1.32   0.079 ** 0.141 *** 
 0.021  0.020   0.021  0.029  11.80   0.031   0.017   
2006-2007 0.527 *** 0.525 *** −0.002   −0.138 *** −0.55 *** 0.251 *** 0.136 *** 
 0.022  0.020   0.020  0.027  0.09   0.028   0.019   
2007-2008 0.527 *** 0.510 *** −0.017   −0.167 *** 6.01   −0.028   0.151 *** 
 0.022  0.019   0.019  0.024  75.07   0.038   0.019   
2008-2009 0.517 *** 0.481 *** −0.036 ** −0.163 *** −9.18   0.018   0.127 *** 
 0.017   0.016   0.016   0.017   550.36   0.029   0.012   
1995-2009 0.459 *** 0.505 *** 0.046 * −0.114 *** −1.07   0.106 *** 0.160 *** 
 0.026  0.026   0.024  0.030  2.30   0.041   0.023   
1995-2004 0.482 *** 0.535 *** 0.053 * −0.124 *** 0.39 *** −0.318 *** 0.177 *** 
 0.019  0.027   0.029  0.030  0.12   0.060   0.020   
2004-2009 0.495 *** 0.486 *** −0.008   −0.152 *** −0.49 *** 0.310 *** 0.144 *** 
 0.022   0.021   0.022   0.022   0.08   0.025   0.016   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eq.(3).  Each statistic is based the sample of farms that 
are present in all years of the relevant period.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 
1000 replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and 
* respectively. 
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Table 3.  Alternative estimates of MV over selected periods 
 Estimation technique 
Period Standard   Smoothed incomes  Instrumented ranks  
1996-1999 0.031  ˗0.004  0.081 *** 
 0.019  0.014  0.023  
1997-2000 ˗0.093 *** 0.003  0.021  
 0.035  0.020  0.027  
1998-2001 ˗0.171 ** ˗0.096 *** ˗0.100 ** 
 0.078  0.035  0.050  
1999-2002 ˗0.149 *** ˗0.127 * ˗0.015  
 0.038  0.069  0.032  
2000-2003 ˗0.162 *** ˗0.071 *** 0.011  
 0.035  0.021  0.028  
2001-2004 ˗0.172 *** ˗0.061 *** ˗0.010  
 0.039  0.019  0.032  
2002-2005 ˗0.065 * ˗0.021  0.042  
 0.034  0.019  0.026  
2003-2006 ˗0.069 * ˗0.018  0.043  
 0.039  0.019  0.028  
2004-2007 ˗0.135 *** ˗0.018  0.017  
 0.040  0.016  0.026  
2005-2008 ˗0.114 *** ˗0.051 *** 0.006  
 0.027  0.017  0.025  
1996-2008 ˗0.017  ˗0.068 *** 0.039  
  0.026  0.020  0.032  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eq.(3).  Each statistic is based on the sample of 
farms that are present not only in the base and final years of each period but also in the 
years immediately before and afterwards to allow construction of the smoothed income 
and instrumented rank variables.  The need to generate lags and leads limits the analysis 
to the period 1996-2008, with the three year intervals chosen to avoid overlap in the 
construction of base and final year measures.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics 
based on 1000 replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted 
by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Table 4.  Dynamic income model results and the implied equilibrium function 
  
Error Correction Model (5)  Equilibrium function (6) 
Explanatory variables 
 
Coeff. 
 
      Robust  
Std error 
 Coeff. Bootsrapped  
Std error 
Change in cropping SGM , 1Ci tx 
 
0.123 * 0.065  -   
Change in livestock SGM , 1Li tx 
 
0.119 * 0.068  -   
Lagged income ity  -0.494 ***
 0.022  -   
Lagged cropping SGM Citx  0.111   0.110  0.224   0.215 
Dummy1996*
Citx   -0.233 ** 0.092  -0.471 *** 0.179 
Dummy1997*
Citx   0.006   0.092  0.013   0.183 
Dummy1998*
Citx   0.039   0.089  0.079   0.176 
Dummy1999*
Citx   -0.036   0.092  -0.074   0.183 
Dummy2000*
Citx   -0.089   0.093  -0.181   0.182 
Dummy2001*
Citx   -0.029   0.092  -0.058   0.177 
Dummy2002*
Citx   0.052   0.088  0.105   0.174 
Dummy2003*
Citx   -0.087   0.093  -0.176   0.178 
Dummy2004*
Citx   -0.093   0.089  -0.187   0.169 
Dummy2005*
Citx   0.148   0.098  0.299   0.189 
Dummy2006*
Citx   0.336 *** 0.091  0.680 *** 0.182 
Dummy2007*
Citx   -0.142   0.107  -0.287   0.214 
Dummy2008*
Citx   0.048   0.096  0.098   0.188 
Lagged livestock SGM Litx  0.291 *** 0.058  0.590 *** 0.118 
Dummy1996*
Litx   -0.262 *** 0.028  -0.530 *** 0.063 
Dummy1997*
Litx   -0.209 *** 0.028  -0.423 *** 0.058 
Dummy1998*
Litx   -0.296 *** 0.026  -0.600 *** 0.053 
Dummy1999*
Litx   -0.174 *** 0.035  -0.352 *** 0.072 
Dummy2000*
Litx   -0.010   0.035  -0.020   0.067 
Dummy2001*
Litx   -0.222 *** 0.035  -0.450 *** 0.064 
Dummy2002*
Litx   -0.111 *** 0.033  -0.225 *** 0.066 
Dummy2003*
Litx   -0.094 *** 0.031  -0.190 *** 0.062 
Dummy2004* Litx   -0.217 *** 0.032  -0.440 *** 0.066 
Dummy2005* Litx   -0.169 *** 0.030  -0.342 *** 0.061 
Dummy2006* Litx   -0.056   0.036  -0.114 * 0.068 
Dummy2007* Litx   -0.042   0.037  -0.086   0.076 
Dummy2008* Litx   -0.087 ** 0.042  -0.176 ** 0.079 
Average cropping SGM .Cix  -0.007   0.066  -0.014   0.127 
Average livestock SGM .Lix  0.004   0.054  0.009   0.107 
Income in sample entry year entryiy  0.178 *** 0.019  0.360 *** 0.032 
Constant 
0ˆ  2300.301 *** 516.871  4659.105 *** 1007.455 
Sample size  6045       
R2  0.23119       
F(34,6010)  35.88-       
Source: Authors’ estimates based on full unbalanced panel.  Robust standard errors allow for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications.  Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
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Table 5.  Income risk and the determinants of structural inequality 
 
Equilibrium 
inequality
*( )tG y  
Observed 
inequality
( )tG y  
Income 
Risk  
MR 
 Contribution to equilibrium 
inequality *( )tG y  
Year 
 Cropping 
SGM 
Livestock 
SGM 
Fixed 
Effects 
1995 0.379 *** 0.505 *** 0.250 ***  0.051   0.176 *** 0.152 *** 
 0.018   0.017 0.032    0.047  0.053  0.044   
1996 0.455 *** 0.447 *** -0.019    0.086  0.050  0.319 *** 
 0.125   0.015 0.279    0.144  0.103  0.120   
1997 0.376 *** 0.512 *** 0.267 ***  0.113 ** 0.047  0.216 *** 
 0.024   0.020 0.051    0.057  0.040  0.060   
1998 0.427 *** 0.511 *** 0.164 **  0.194 ** -0.002  0.235 *** 
 0.032   0.023 0.065    0.087  0.021  0.077   
1999 0.358 *** 0.543 *** 0.340 ***  0.063  0.083  0.212 *** 
 0.021   0.021 0.040    0.061  0.051  0.064   
2000 0.381 *** 0.550 *** 0.307 ***  0.007  0.208 *** 0.166 *** 
 0.023   0.023 0.047    0.022  0.057  0.047   
2001 0.386 *** 0.554 *** 0.302 ***  0.093  0.045  0.249 *** 
 0.030   0.024 0.055    0.072  0.045  0.069   
2002 0.376 *** 0.518 *** 0.274 ***  0.102 ** 0.108 *** 0.166 *** 
 0.019   0.022 0.039    0.046  0.041  0.049   
2003 0.337 *** 0.452 *** 0.254 ***  0.012  0.130 *** 0.195 *** 
 0.023   0.018 0.051    0.035  0.048  0.046   
2004 0.353 *** 0.490 *** 0.278 ***  0.010  0.083  0.261 *** 
 0.029   0.020  0.056    0.032  0.074  0.070   
2005 0.383 *** 0.494 *** 0.225 ***  0.195 *** 0.059 * 0.129 *** 
 0.025   0.020 0.053    0.065  0.036  0.050   
2006 0.409 *** 0.525 *** 0.220 ***  0.240 *** 0.088 *** 0.081 ** 
 0.016   0.020 0.035    0.040  0.030  0.035   
2007 0.413 *** 0.536 *** 0.231 **  0.004  0.268 *** 0.141 ** 
 0.058   0.021 0.108    0.037  0.079  0.062   
2008 0.374 *** 0.513 *** 0.272 ***  0.106 ** 0.128 ** 0.140 *** 
 0.019   0.016 0.037    0.050  0.052  0.048   
2009 0.372 *** 0.480 *** 0.225 ***  0.058  0.193 *** 0.122 *** 
 0.024   0.017  0.049   0.057   0.065   0.044  
Average contribution to equilibrium inequality  22.6%  29.2%  48.2%  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eqs. (7) and (8).  All summary statistics based on 
the full sample available in the relevant year.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics 
based on 1000 replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Table 6.  Decomposition of vertical mobility MV  
 
MV 
Contribution to vertical mobility MV 
Period 
Change in 
cropping 
SGM 
Change in 
livestock  
SGM 
Equilibrium 
error Residual 
1995-1996 −0.1229 *** −0.0005   −0.0004   −0.0778 *** −0.0442 *** 
 0.0182  0.0011   0.0009  0.0105  0.0169   
1996-1997 −0.0306 ** 0.0006   −0.0007   −0.0443 *** 0.0138   
 0.0146  0.0014   0.0008  0.0120  0.0193   
1997-1998 −0.1048 *** 0.0007   0.0005   −0.1109 *** 0.0049   
 0.0299  0.0010   0.0008  0.0181  0.0284   
1998-1999 −0.0727 ** −0.0033   0.0008   −0.0936 *** 0.0234   
 0.0286  0.0049   0.0009  0.0197  0.0232   
1999-2000 −0.1729 *** −0.0014   0.0012   −0.1488 *** −0.0239   
 0.0258  0.0017   0.0009  0.0209  0.0244   
2000-2001 −0.1623 *** 0.0033   0.0013 * −0.1749 *** 0.0080   
 0.0287  0.0030   0.0008  0.0230  0.0274   
2001-2002 −0.2360 *** −0.0007   0.0004   −0.1391 *** −0.0966 ** 
 0.0548  0.0026   0.0007  0.0300  0.0493   
2002-2003 −0.0741 ** −0.0006   −0.0005   −0.1399 *** 0.0669 * 
 0.0290  0.0022   0.0009  0.0320  0.0400   
2003-2004 −0.1199 *** −0.0013   −0.0004   −0.1035 *** −0.0147   
 0.0233  0.0013   0.0006  0.0155  0.0244   
2004-2005 −0.1160 *** 0.0006   −0.0001   −0.0866 *** −0.0299   
 0.0226  0.0018   0.0005  0.0143  0.0246   
2005-2006 −0.1041 *** 0.0011   0.0003   −0.1711 *** 0.0656 *** 
 0.0289  0.0012   0.0015  0.0271  0.0205   
2006-2007 −0.1378 *** 0.0004   −0.0005   −0.1637 *** 0.0261   
 0.0267  0.0007   0.0009  0.0177  0.0258   
2007-2008 −0.1674 *** −0.0004   0.0010   −0.1334 *** −0.0347   
 0.0244  0.0011   0.0010  0.0172  0.0224   
2008-2009 −0.1627 *** 0.0005   0.0012   −0.1252 *** −0.0390 ** 
 0.0174  0.0010   0.0012  0.0169  0.0181   
1995-2009 −0.1140 *** −0.0067   −0.0075   −0.1269 *** 0.0270   
 0.0299  0.0097   0.0218  0.0281  0.0435   
1995-2004 −0.1239 *** −0.0080   0.0025   −0.1638 *** 0.0454   
 0.0302  0.0097   0.0105  0.0307  0.0461   
2004-2009 −0.1525 *** 0.0007   0.0083   −0.2466 *** 0.0851 *** 
 0.0224   0.0036   0.0087  0.0355  0.0289   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eqs. (10) and (13).  Sample definitions as given 
in Table 2.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
